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Abstract 
 
This research analyzes security sector reform in Tunisia, and focuses on Tunisia’s Community 
Policing (CP) program in particular.  CP is identified as an effective form of policing in the 
context of Tunisia’s political transition and continuing security concerns.  This work pinpoints 
a number of gaps in the existing pilot CP program and areas for improvement, and proposes 
additional ways to address separate but interrelated problems by means of new policing 
methods, based on comparative research into methods used in the United States and Germany.  
It proposes to expand the existing private-public partnerships, which are at the heart of CP, 
and it identifies some areas of cooperation between the police and society that can be 
generalized across nations.  Finally, the argument is put forth that police reform is a multi-
pronged, multi-sectoral effort, relying on the efforts of many actors other than the police.2 
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I. Introduction  
Since the 2011 Revolution, Tunisia has witnessed a number of efforts at reforming the 
security sector, particularly focusing on the internal security apparatus. The police have long 
played a central role in the internal security apparatus of Tunisia at the local community level, 
and previous regimes have traditionally derived their power from police. Ironically, although 
Ben Ali, the previous president and dictator, had a military background, he did not rise to 
power by way of military coup, as his counterparts in other Arab countries have.3 Instead, he 
came to power through a police coup, and thereafter, the police were his primary instrument 
of maintaining power and oppressing dissent. 4 A critical goal of the leaders of the revolution 
and their successors has been the reform of the police, supported internationally by 
institutional reform initiatives from donors including the US, Finland,5 Qatar,6 Norway, 
Japan, Belgium among others. Although considerable efforts have been made at reform since 
the revolution, the rift between law enforcement and the communities they police remains 
wide and in many ways is increasing.  
Reforming the security apparatus in the current counter-terrorism context poses a special 
challenge. Police have once again adopted aggressive policing methods as terrorism continues 
to rise. What is clear is that aggressive policing has not been successful. Tunisia’s 
conventional strategy of coercive top-down policing has served to alienate and fragment 
society. The answer therefore lies in a softer bottom-up strategy, and involves examining 
ways to create a force that polices society effectively while adhering to human rights and 
democratic principles.7  This is actually a global dilemma, reflected in the policies adopted in 
the context of countering violent extremism (CVE). Policies are mostly focused on 
containment and less so on proactive policing strategies. What emerges is a disturbing trend 
                                                 
3 Lutterback, Derek. “Tunisia After Ben Ali: Retooling the Tools of Oppression?” Norwegian Peacebuilding 
Resource Centre. Policy brief/Executive Summary. May 2013.  
4 Id. 
5 In addition, there have been a number of internationally supported SSR efforts such as the one from the United 
States which include training partnerships. In June 2014, The International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP) hosted four colonels from Tunisia through the International Police Education and Training Program. 
After meeting with federal and local law enforcement in Washington DC, the delegates took part in training 
activities by IACP, Northeastern University and the Boston Police Department.   
6 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Tunisia and the Government of 
the State of Qatar on military cooperation. Order number 3178. 31 July 2013. http://www.legislation-
securite.tn/ar/node/32040  
7 Aepli, Pierre. Toolkit on Police Integrity. The Generva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF). 2012 
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of the broad use of force and impunity by police. The result is a pattern of further 
radicalization that is not solely correlated with social grievances themselves, but also arises as 
a result of lack of focus on the underlying social causes.  
This thesis will first provide a general assessment of the principal issues regarding legislation, 
administration, and police operations, as well as societal issues. It then focuses on the 
fledgling, but promising community policing (CP) program. Studying the underlying drivers 
of disorder reveals the absence of key infrastructure to address these gaps in both civilian and 
police efforts, and demonstrates that although the number of those turning to jihadism is 
currently increasing, there is a dearth in adequate intervention mechanisms. In particular, 
currently there is no de-radicalization program in Tunisia or similar intervention program 
despite the significant threat of terrorism in the country. It will be shown that a de-
radicalization program can serve as an effective intervention mechanism that supports 
counterterrorism policing efforts on the local level and the CVE efforts in the country overall. 
Second, the thesis will address police capacity in mental health services, which has serious 
implications on public disorder and crime. Specifically, inappropriate responses to mental 
health issues contribute to increased use of force by police. The thesis also advocates the 
implementation of a Memphis-model Crisis Intervention Team, which is a partnership and 
training mechanism for appropriate police response to the mentally ill. Efforts at developing a 
better approach to social problems caused by mental illness and substance addiction are 
directly applicable to the prevention of radicalization and terrorism, as the mentally ill are 
uniquely vulnerable to radicalization efforts. 
The security apparatus’s hold on Tunisia can be traced to at least as early as 1956. In the 
period between 1956-2011 the Tunisian government enacted 1,700 pieces of legislation, 
which include approximately 1,200 still in operation. Most of these were “promulgated in the 
form of presidential decrees, a way to legally bend the security forces and shape their main 
functions to protect the regime instead of the people.”8  Ben Ali’s government, in place from 
1987 until 2011, was particularly oppressive in the way it systematically silenced any dissent. 
His grip on power by way of police force played a substantial role in the regime’s demise. In 
the last days of his rule, “Tunisians watched in wonder as the military inexplicably withdrew 
                                                 
8 Bouguerra, Bassem. “Reforming Tunisia’s Troubled Security Sector.” Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for 
the Middle East. October 2014.  
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from positions defending the capital.”9 Then, on 24 January 2011 General Rachid Ammar 
proclaimed to thousands of protestors: “Our revolution is your revolution”, and that the “the 
army will protect your revolution.”10 The General’s decision not to fire on civilians was 
arguably the death knell on Ben Ali’s reign.  After being advised by Ammar there would be a 
three-hour air time slot to guarantee his safe departure from the country, Ben Ali’s fled to 
Saudi Arabia the next day.11 During the Interim government, there were frequent clashes 
between the police and civilians and the military would act to secure the situation and prevent 
the police from using violence to suppress protest. In fact, the Tunisian military is an entirely 
independent entity, unlike “any other in North Africa and the Middle East” it is “much 
smaller, more professional and historically apolitical.”12 “The armed forces clearly ascribe to 
the concept of civilian oversight of the military, and although they are currently fulfilling a 
number of internal security tasks, they have publicly, and repeatedly, stated their intention to 
return to the barracks when the police can again fulfill their security functions.”13  
Following the Revolution, there was promise of change during the interim government, the 
Troika coalition composed of Ennahda (moderate Islamist), Ettakatol (social democratic), and 
Congress for the Republic (center left and secular). Though there has been much change, in 
many ways pre-revolutionary patterns of oppression have continued. The key demands in the 
Revolution, which included measures to address corruption, poverty and political repression, 
have yet to be met. Tunisian’s opinions are divided along party lines, with some actually 
preferring the pre-revolution status quo.14 For this reason, the big tent secularist political party 
Nidaa Tounes was elected in 2014; they seek a return of the matrach (dictatorship), arguing 
there is a need to reign in the freedom of expression, which has now existed for four years.15 
Such nostalgic sentiments are particularly characteristic of certain classes of constituents, viz., 
                                                 
9 Kirkpatrick, David A. “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for the ‘Revolution.’” The New York 
Times. 24 January, 2011 
10 Id. 
11  Lasserre, Isabelle. “Rachid Ammar, le centurion du peuple.” Le Figaro. 21 January, 2011.  
12 Kirkpatrick, David A. “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for the ‘Revolution.’” The New York 
Times. 24 January, 2011 
13 Hanlon, Querine. “The Prospects for Security Sector Reform In Tunisia: A Year After the Revolution.” 
Strategic Studies Institute Monograph. U.S. Army War College. September 2012 
14 Interview with Rim El Gantri, Director at the International Center for Transitional Justice, Tunis. 18 
September 2015. 
15 Interview with Rim El Gantri, Director at the International Center for Transitional Justice, Tunis. 18 
September 2015. 
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those groups involved in maintaining the security of the country.16 Prior to the Revolution for 
example the right to wear the veil was restricted to the traditional Tunisian way which left 
part of a woman’s hair and neck uncovered; if worn in the religious way, women were subject 
to harassment, assault and being barred from work or school. Veils were forbidden during 
examinations. 17 Now even men are forbidden from overt displays of religiosity, and are 
notably required to shave their beards.  Furthermore, a number of mosques have recently been 
closed out of fear that terrorist activities were being organized within them.18  
Universities were also very politicized, and consequently politicians paid considerable 
attention to the political activities of students and faculty.19 The old regime in fact staged 
events so that students who were outspoken politically, attended meetings, and convened with 
political associates would be caught speaking about inappropriate subjects.  The universities 
were even built in such a way that police stations were strategically embedded within 
campuses, in order to police political protest and conduct surveillance.20 This was actually a 
way to lure politically interested students out of the shadows; the regime even hired 
professional actors to speak with left-wing students in order to expose them.  Involvement 
subsequently ensured that the student would be blacklisted politically and excluded from 
employment with the government.  This was a cunning move by the regime, preying on the 
traditional cultural openness of Tunisians; an important teaching of Islam is that one ought to 
give the benefit of the doubt to all people one encounters.  When there is an observed 
difference, there is a tendency among Tunisians not to view this difference with suspicion. In 
such a cultural context, people were highly susceptible to the government’s operations.21 
In the current context, public spaces have opened, elections are broadly fair, and 
representatives of all political parties are able to enter government.  There has been a shift in 
terms of open expression in Tunisia, particularly in terms of openness to the outside world. 
Tunisia currently does not maintain diplomatic relations with Syria, which were suspended by 
                                                 
16 Interview with Emna Sammari, Program Associate at the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 
Tunis. 18 September 2015.  
17 Id. 
18 “Tunisia launches security clampdown after Sousse attack.” BBC. 27 June 2015 
19 Interview with Hosni Mouelhi, Program coordinator at Open Society Foundations, Tunis. 22 September 2015. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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Moncef Marzouki (president 2011-2014).22 However, in the newly open political climate, 
members of Tunisian civil society have travelled to Syria, met with Syrian officials, and 
visited Tunisian inmates in Syrian prisoners, and held a press conference upon their return.23 
All of this took place without disturbance by Tunisian government authorities. Tunisia is 
therefore considerably more open than before in terms of social expression and action. 
A. Has the moment for reform passed? 
Critics contend that meaningful reform has not occurred, arguing that police and security 
forces have yet to demonstrate accountability. In the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) there 
“remain black boxes with opaque decision making processes, governed by officer networks 
that have resisted reform, financial transparency, and political oversight.”24  
Nonetheless, opinion on whether security sector reform can truly gain traction in the country 
is divided, and diverging opinions have emerged in the literature since 2011. Some argue that 
the opportunity has been missed because certain necessary goals have not been attained in the 
most ideal timeframe where they would have made a meaningful impact.25 Others argue that 
reform is progressing relatively well and that time is needed for concrete results to emerge.26  
Particular problems include mental health, drug abuse, and youth issues including 
unemployment, disillusion with national institutions, corruption, and in general the efficacy of 
government.  Tunisians have long lived under authoritarian regimes, in which the institutions 
of the state were perceived as adversaries, rather than as institutions helping them to live 
fulfilling lives.  Law was viewed as an instrument of oppression, rather than order.  Such 
attitudes pose large challenges to any reform effort. 
 
C. The political transition has not occurred yet 
The political revolution begun in Tunisia in 2011 is not yet complete.27 Members of the media 
in Tunisia argue the opposite, that the political transition is complete; as a new legislature has 
been elected under the new 2014 Constitution, the foundation for the new state has been 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Sayigh, Yezid. "Missed Opportunity: The Politics of Police Reform in Egypt and Tunisia." Carnegie Middle 
East Center, 17 Mar. 2015. 
25 Id. 
26 Discussion with UNDP Tunisia Rule of Law director Martin Borgeaud. New York. 10 April 2015.   
27 Id. 
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completed. This belief is also common in society.  On the other hand, a series of necessary 
reforms have not yet been implemented. A tradition of centralized government dates back 
over 500 years, and the new government has yet to decentralize.  The instruments of the 
current government are based on a concept of a centralized state.  A municipal ordinance must 
be passed for decentralization to take place, and for this aspect of political reform to take 
place.28 Furthermore, most of the new institutions of government present in the new 
constitution, aside from the parliament, have yet to be established. 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which existing institutions have the will to change and 
reform.  The MOI has repeatedly expressed the will to reform itself, but its will to change can 
only be measured by the actions that follow such words.  It is likely that it is inappropriate to 
measure such willingness immediately, as the current government is only a year old.  
There is also a substantial disconnect between residents of coastal areas and the interior. 
Mouelhi explains that, historically, development in Tunisia has been restricted primarily to 
the coast, and the interior has been marginalized. Tunisians who live along the coast have 
subscribed to an “image of a country that was successful or at least relatively successful from 
a microeconomic perspective” even though many of them dispute this now.29  On the other 
hand, those who resided in the interior experienced poor conditions and repression, and had 
first-hand knowledge of such oppression, notably the repression of an uprising in the south of 
the country, sparked by economic privation.  Coastal residents, when they uncovered what 
was happening, were horrified, and asked how these things would happen in their country.  
Such ignorance is common.30 
It was not only the coastal residents who were ignorant of the repression of the state and the 
resulting economic problems.31 Indeed, the country received praise in 2008 from Dominique 
Strauss Khan, then Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as an example for 
other countries in the region.32 In other words, the roots of present efforts at reform must be 
seen in their historical context, whereby the scope of Tunisia’s problems were not fully 
recognized.  
                                                 
28 Interview with Hosni Mouelhi, Program coordinator at Open Society Foundations, Tunis. 22 September 2015. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 International Monetary Fund. IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn's Statement at the Conclusion 
of His Visit to Tunisia. Press Release No. 08/291.18 Nov. 2008.  
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A further problem rooted in the legacy of the government of Ben Ali was the singular focus 
on political rights, to the neglect of socioeconomic issues, due to restrictions placed on 
freedom of expression and assembly; political parties essentially then focused on their 
survival.  Once Ben Ali’s government had fallen, Decree 8833 was passed and it became 
relatively easy to form political parties and civil society organizations, and such groups were 
less concerned with their survival.  Opposition politicians were simply not accustomed to 
frank discussions about economic issues, and were ill-prepared to address the concerns of an 
unemployed and underemployed populace once their immediate repression had ended.   
Hosni Moelhi of Open Society Foundations disagrees with the notion, argued by Yezid 
Sayigh, that the moment for reform has passed. He attributes the current system of 
government in Tunisia, and its mechanisms and institutions, to being the product of eight 
hundred years of evolution, involving the country’s historical Islamic roots as well as the 
legacy of French colonialism, and displays continuities with such eras.  With the same actors 
in place, problems will persist.  The country now resembles very much what it was under Ben 
Ali.   
 
II. Methodology  
This qualitative case study is based on interviews, field notes and research.  The interviews 
draw upon consultations with experts in government, members of civil society, mental health 
and security in Tunisia and the United States.  Fieldwork in Tunisia was conducted in 
September 2015, in partnership with CEMAT (Le Centre d’Etudes Maghrébines à Tunis) and 
the Ministry of Higher Education in Tunis. Field observations in the cities of Tunis, La 
Galoulette, Bizerte, Sidi Bou Said, and Hammamet consisted of interviews. This was 
complemented by interviews conducted in the U.S.  Research sources included open source 
data, as well as documents viewed in visits to the National Archives of Tunisia. 
                                                 
33 Decree Number 88 for the Year 2011 Published on 24 September 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of 
Associations. 
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III. The Tunisian Internal Security Forces  
A. Structure of the Police 
The Tunisian internal security forces (ISF) include the following organizations: the police 
(shurta), National Guard (al-Ḥaras al-Waṭani), and Judicial Police (which function in the 
Ministry of Justice and courts but is controlled by the MOI)34 all housed within the Ministry 
of Interior; the Intervention Forces (SWAT) and the Presidential Guard Forces (PGF). 
Estimating the size of the security sector in Tunisia is complicated. As a result of the 
distortion of facts from the government, prior to the Revolution, the security forces were 
believed to number at least 150,000.35 Although much information can be found on the MOI’s 
open data website, the information on the security forces is empty under its assigned tab.36 
According to Mohammad Lazhar Akremi who served as minister delegate to the MOI and 
was tasked with reforms under the prior transitional government, before the revolution the 
size of the ISF, including police, National Guard, and civil defense forces, was 49,000 under 
Ben Ali. Following the revolution, an additional 12,000 recruits were hired so the total rose 
61,000.37 Of these, approximately half were “part-time augmentation forces or paid 
informants.”38 In order to sustain the image of a huge security apparatus that the Ben Ali 
regime was trying to project, police worked “unsustainably long hours, handling enormous 
workloads.”39 
B. The Tunisian Ministry of Interior 
Despite the fact that the Ministry of Interior has for some time been perceived as a "black 
box" in terms of its operations, there have been several efforts at reforms. The first was 
carried out by Mr. Farhat Rajhi, Interior Minister in the Ghannouchi Essebi II government, at 
the end of March 2011. This set of reforms involved the dissolution of the Security 
                                                 
34 Hanlon, Querine. “Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year After the Jasmine Revolution.” USIP Special 
Report 304. 12 March 2012 
35 Id. 
36 http://opendata.interieur.gov.tn/fr/datas/index/type:7/categorie:1/source:12 Accessed 1 December 2015 
37 Author Querine Hanlon interview with Mohammad Lazhar Akremi, Tunis, January 25, 2012. Hanlon, 
Querine. “The Prospects for Security Sector Reform In Tunisia: A Year After the Revolution.” Strategic Studies 
Institute Monograph. U.S. Army War College. September 2012 
38 Hanlon, Querine. “Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year After the Jasmine Revolution.” USIP Special 
Report 304. 12 March 2012 
39 Bouguerra, Bassem. “Reforming Tunisia’s Troubled Security Sector.” Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for 
the Middle East.  October 2014.  
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Directorate of the State under which the notoriously political police functioned and the 
dismissal and reassignment of several top level security officials and about forty lower level 
officials. In reaction, two thousand people attacked his ministry resulting in him being 
dismissed after only two months. 
The second reform effort came with the new government that followed the elections of 23 
October 2011. Starting January 2012 at the orders of Ali Laaravedh, Minister of Interior, there 
were a number of reassignments of senior security officials such as Moncef Laajimi,40 who 
directed the anti-riot police between January 10 and 12.  These actions were also followed by 
aggressive reaction, such as the unions asking for intervention from brigades to unite with 
them in their barracks. 
In the late part of 2011, a "White Paper" was presented by Lazhar Mohamed Akremi, Minister 
of Interior under the Essebi government, who was charged with reforming the Tunisian 
security apparatus. This White Paper, so far the most ambitious reform project,41 was the 
outcome of four months of debate by a committee established by the MOI. The committee of 
thirty members of the security forces convened daily in workshops. Recommendations made 
by the report, spanning six chapters, included the restructuring of the security apparatus, the 
evaluation of recruitment and training programs for officers, the establishment of an internal 
dialogue on community policing, the rationalization of working tools, and the unification of 
administrative mechanisms.42 It was envisioned that there would be three entities at the MOI: 
a higher-level entity charged with developing strategies and providing leadership, a central 
entity that would control and manage day-to-day operations, and a lower court which executes 
policy. The idea was that all would function in a dynamic and decentralized manner. It also 
sought the creation of a municipal police force that would function without weapons, an early 
step in the pursuit of a police force that would gradually work towards rapprochement 
between itself and the citizens. 
Many of the objectives outlined in this White Paper have not been met yet. Akremi has said 
that part of the problem has been that security forces are hindered by the lack of political will, 
                                                 
40 “MI : La mise à la retraite de Moncef Laajimi n’est qu’une procédure administrative.” Mosaiquefm. 25 April 
2013.  
41 Hanlon, Querine. “The Prospects for Security Sector Reform In Tunisia: A Year After the Revolution.” 
Strategic Studies Institute Monograph. U.S. Army War College. September 2012 
42 Hanène Zbiss interview with Lazhar Akremi, former Deputy Minister with the Minister of Interior. “La 
volonté politique est absente.” Réalités.  2 February 2013 
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and kept in the dark: “there is a manipulation that officers work with only 30% of their true 
abilities. The police can solve all the problems that exist in the country. We have officers in 
sufficient numbers, with great skill and significant mobilization capacity that can restore 
security throughout the country in just two weeks and without repression.”43 Akremi among 
others attributes the hindering of thorough reform of security sector to a lack of political will. 
On the other hand, some signs of change. For example, two members of NAWAT, a leading 
opposition group during the Revolution were appointed as members at the MOI.44 
C. How Tunisian police operate in the counter-terrorism context  
Though the stated aim of the MOI has been to reform itself and improve relations with 
civilians, according to civil rights groups, after the last 2014 election the MOI has reverted to 
old practices involving systematic human rights violations by the police, including torture.  
Whereas before the revolution, people rarely discussed human rights issues, there is a more 
open discussion on these matters. This is especially the case as regards the state’s 
counterterrorism policy, which fails to respect the rule of law in its operations.45 For the most 
part no specific groups are singled out, but the families of those arrested on charges of 
terrorism will typically be targeted.  In contrast to general human rights issues, the violation 
of the rights of those suspected of terrorism is rarely discussed openly. Tunisian journalists 
tend to refrain from writing about this, as they themselves have been affected by terrorism.  
The reality of arbitrary detention and torture by police is detailed only in reports in the foreign 
press.46 
In a speech on the 58th anniversary of the founding of the Republic, in Djerba on 25 July 
2015, former President Moncef Marzouki criticized the current legislation on anti-terrorism, 
which allows the death penalty, emphasizing that the law endangered liberties and freedoms 
more than terrorism itself.  He argued that the fight against terrorism should be undertaken in 
a manner that respects human rights.  In response to criticism directed against the ten deputies 
that abstained during the vote for the anti-terrorism law, he asserted he would do the same if 
he were a member, adding that democracy had to be respected, and that an expression of 
                                                 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 “An Analysis of Tunisia’s Draft Counterterrorism Law.” Human Rights Watch. 8 April 2015. 
46 Id.  
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differences in opinion does not imply sympathy with terrorism.47  The United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counterterrorism has argued that the 2003 law, when it was 
used during the Ben Ali administration, “did not provide the Tunisian people with more 
security, but was widely abused as a tool of oppression against any form of political 
dissent.”48 Following recent terror attacks in the post-revolutionary period, a number of 
individuals have again been charged under this law. 
On 25 November 2015, a suicide bomber blew up the presidential guard bus in the center of 
Tunis.  Following this attack, a state of emergency was instituted, and a curfew between 9 PM 
and 5 AM was imposed.  Security officials intensified raids and made numerous arrests, 
particularly in certain neighborhoods.  In la Goullete, suburbs in northern Tunis, police 
carried out brutal raids at 2 AM, pointing guns and engaging in intimidating behavior.  Those 
arrested late recounted that the police, “broke down the doors at their houses and pointed their 
guns at the men, women and children. Several of these men, young and old, were arrested and 
taken to the headquarters of the criminal police in El Gorjani in Tunis without explanation and 
under the threat of arms. Three hours later, they were all released without none of the has 
been prosecuted.”49 Arrests were made, after which the suspects were released.  Another case 
involved a medical student, Slim Ghedira, who was brutally arrested and only allowed to 
leave once he had signed a document that he could not read, and the contents of which he was 
not allowed to know.  He stated, “I wanted to know what I was going to sign but the officer 
threatened every time I asked to read the document. After an hour of harassment and 
gratuitous violence I resigned myself to sign.”50 There are organizations that exist to defend 
the rights of those charged with participation in terrorism, but the media alleges that they exist 
only to defend the rights Salaafists.51 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 “Moncef Marzouki : la loi antiterroriste est plus dangereuse que le terrorisme.”  Mosaiquefm. 26 July 2015.  
48 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin : addendum, 14 March 
2012, A/HRC/20/14/Add.1.  
49 “ Tunisie : Guerre contre le terrorisme et bavures policières.” Kapitalis.  27 November 2015.  
50 Id.  
51 Interview with Rim El Gantri, Director at the International Center for Transitional Justice, Tunis. 18 
September 2015. 
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D. Accessing the detained  
The Tunisian League for Human Rights is one of several organizations that makes visits to 
prisons to visit inmates, and has sometimes experienced harassment and mistreatment by 
police and security agents.  At times they have been barred entry into the prison altogether, 
hindering their ability to ascertain compliance by the authorities with human rights protocols 
regarding prisoner treatment. 
Prior to the revolution, human rights groups and individual defenders wishing to visit 
detainees were unable to do so freely.  They were required to submit a request in advance and 
wait for an appointment.  A lawyer recounted her experience visiting prison before the 
revolution, describing the prison like “paradise.  They were playing music.  The walls were 
newly painted,” implying that the prison was a Potemkin village.52 After the revolution, all 
organizations may come and go at will, and visitation authorization is usually granted.  
However, the interaction is closely controlled; phone conversations between visitors and 
prisoners are monitored by staff, so confidential matters are not discussed. 
Tunisia in general has a culture of surveillance, not limited to prisons.  Surveillance is 
directed in particular to some groups such as transitional justice organizations, which contend 
with efforts to eliminate the transitional justice process altogether.  Transitional justice 
advocates have described phone calls during which they report having often heard voices; 
sometimes they hear the person that is listening hang up before the other person starts 
talking.53 
IV.  The Tunisian Community Policing Model 
The most recent bone fide attempt to reform Tunisia’s police sector has been the Tunisian 
community-policing program, a joint project between UNDP and the MOI. The first phase of 
the project was launched at the end of 2011. The second phase launched in August 2013 still 
continuing by UNDP under its mandate to provide support to national authorities in 
strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict contexts. It seeks to support the Tunisian MOI 
and SSR process, working on all components of SSR and aims to change the face of security 
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forces, which were seen as tools of the regime. The preliminary phase of the project was 
introduced in August 2011, concluding in September 2012. Following the UNDP 2012 Action 
Plan, the second phase of the project was launched in 2013 as part of its strategy to support 
the democratic transition in Tunisia.  Prior to the revolution, the MOI, as an administration, 
was opaque in all of its operations, which meant that there was no contact with external 
organizations, and no official contact with citizens.54 What renders this SSR effort unique is 
that the MOI has expressed the will to reform itself. The stated objectives of the MOI for the 
program is that “since 2011, it tried to regain the trust of citizens and civil society through the 
opening of security institution to the outside world by opening media as a token of good will 
to build an institution based on transparency and clear vision which requires the research of 
better mechanisms and tools to address the country’s security situation and the reform of the 
security system.”55 It further seeks to “define the means of preventions and protection that go 
beyond the traditional security institution towards social considerations citizen-oriented and 
consolidation of close relations, trust and reconciliation between the latter and the safety 
officer; establish an interactive partnership, where citizens will be aware of the importance of 
his role in the security of the region.”56 
A working group from the MOI was formed to develop this ministerial policy. MOI 
representatives visited Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and Japan to 
identify best practices. Following the consultations, best practices were identified after which 
a model of CP was developed to fit the Tunisian context: The Tunisian Model of CP. The 
project was subsequently funded by Japan, Belgium, and Norway. In order to gauge the 
specific needs of communities, UNDP organized workshops and roundtables with civil 
society.  
In the initial phase of the project, a survey was conducted in the selected pilot localities to 
measure specific areas of need. The criteria measured included: Ethics, reception, the 
assistance of the victims, and the level of trust between citizen and police forces.  At the 
beginning of 2016, a second survey will be launched to measure current progress and identify 
areas for improvement.  
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The project between UNDP and MOI is based on four goals: 1. Support to the review of the 
legal framework. 2. Support for strengthening the capacities of inspections. 3. Human 
resource management 4. Support to improve the relationship between security forces and 
citizens. The Tunisian CP program operates on the basis of four legal frameworks. It provides 
support to management structures especially inspections, oversight, and human resources 
management. The first police station was inaugurated in June of 2014, and the last of the six 
pilots was launched last April. After the inauguration, two trainers from UNDP embarked on 
the process of coaching the chief, agents and staff of the police stations. Assistance was 
provided towards the process of rehabilitation of stations and provision of new equipment; 
improvement of the reception areas; improvement of the security of agents; improvement of 
the security of buildings as well as the procurement of agents. A recruitment process was 
launched to enlist two experts in the field in order to coach and impart best practices.57 
A. The six pilot police stations  
In collaboration with the MOI, six pilot stations were selected. The program has been 
implemented in Marsa Ouest, Sidi Hsine El Attar, and Sakiet Ezzit for the National Police, 
and Naassen, Manaret Hammamet and Sidi Ali Ben Aoun for the National Guard.58 This past 
September, Marsa marked one year of successful implementation, an early indication that 
shows promise for the program overall.  
B. Leveraging partnerships for effective community policing 
CP activities are tailored to the unique needs of each locality, as different types of 
partnerships are leveraged.59 For instance, urban and rural areas tend to have different 
demands. The specific characteristics of Les Berges du Lac (Tunis) for example, render it a 
more difficult locality to implement CP. It is an affluent town, home to corporate offices, 
embassies and various institutions, and, consequently, residents are less likely to come in 
contact with police officers. On the other hand, in popular localities there is a more intimate 
interaction between law enforcement and civilians; agents are on a first name basis with 
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civilians, knowing who their families are. There is therefore a closer contact with police and 
criminals in the area. This specific context facilitates easier implementation of CP. Marsa 
West illustrates a locality more conducive to CP implementation. There is a robust interest in 
the program and expression of the will to have the program institutionalized. The stakeholders 
there are very active and very interested in seeing the program succeed. This ownership of the 
project was demonstrated in May of 2014 when a major forum was held for civil society and a 
number of the associations present projected the CP project as their own, a sign of their 
enthusiasm.60 In Marsa, the process of defining the priorities in the area has successful 
resulted in a closer contact between the police forces and associations. One of the CP 
initiatives in the city is the local committee of security implemented to address security 
concerns and devise solutions.61 
On June 5, 2014, the pilot was launched in Hammamet, which is a touristic area with two big 
localities with slightly different landscapes.62 Manaret Hammamet, is not as touristic the more 
popular side of Hammamet. There, a number of education-based organizations exist whose 
very active members include school directors and teachers. The CP program organized with 
them local discussions involving citizens, such as students and parents, on dialogue relating to 
school violence. Another active movement in Manaret Hammamet, are the scouts with whom 
CP also sought partnerships. In Sidi Ali Ben Aoun (Sidi Bouzid), a rural locality with forest 
areas, the forest guards were invited to the local committee to participate in dialogue. Thus, 
CP mobilizes partnerships on the basis of the unique needs of the particular locality.63 
 
C. The four- pillar framework of the Tunisian CP model  
The four pillars of the Tunisian CP model build on the experiences of CP program studies and 
adopt new approaches to fit the country’s specific milieu. The four pillars are partnerships, 
problem solving, communication, and the delivery of quality services.  
 
 
                                                 
60 Interview with Houssem Eddine Ishak, National expert on Security Sector Reform, UNDP Tunisia. 21 
September 2015. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id 
  
 
 
Lea Lavut: Building Partnerships Towards a Democratic Police Force in the Post-
Revolutionary Tunisia Context 
117 
1. Partnerships 
The partnerships component is based on the premise that ensuring security and quality of life 
are not strictly the domain of the police. Rather, it should be a concerted effort of all sectors 
of society, partnering together to solve problems.64 
 
2. Problem solving  
Problem solving involves the recognition that the traditional approach of reactive and 
repressive policing does not positively impact crime reduction efforts. Instead, a security 
policy built on proactive crime prevention, results in a more secure environment.65 This 
approach is based on non-criminal preventative measures, focusing on the direct factors 
surrounding a given crime as well as the social prevention component. The early prevention 
philosophy seeks to solve problems in the short, medium and long term. The approach is 
fourfold: It involves problem identification, analysis, solutions, and the evaluation of the 
procedures followed. This method seeks to address the problem before it escalates into more 
dangerous crime, acting as an early intervention mechanism.66  
Here, the “neighborhood agent” plays a key role in dispute resolution in collaboration with the 
citizens of the locality. The “neighborhood officer” has more control compared to traditional 
police officers in that he has more independence in terms of decision-making on problems 
that arise on the ground, where he is permanently based. He interacts closely with the public, 
and is not automatically subject to the organizational hierarchy, unless certain situations deem 
it necessary.67 
 
3. Communication  
Communication is a powerful transparency mechanism within institutions.68 An essential 
component to building trust between police officers and civil society is the sharing of 
information and problems. It will impose the necessary checks on the organization and its 
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agents who have traditionally conducted themselves with impunity towards members of the 
public. The desired outcome of this approach then, is that it would contribute to the mentality 
shift essential to meaningful and sustainable reform.69 
 
4. The delivery of quality services  
Finally, CP seeks to facilitate an improvement in the quality of services delivery to citizens. 
This includes ensuring timely resolution to problems and keeping citizens adequately apprised 
of judicial proceedings. The treatment of vulnerable populations, which includes the elderly, 
as well as victims is also addressed under this pillar.70 
 
D. Towards effective CP implementation: UNDP roadmap to address problem areas in 
the current security structure 
The effective implementation of the CP model is also contingent on the application of 
changes to the existing security structures.  This includes the training of local police, the 
implementation of a sound infrastructure conducive to effective policing, addressing issues 
concerning the current organizational structure, and the communication with the civilian 
population as well as within the MOI. 
  
1. The Training of local police officers 
Essential to the success of CP is effective communication between local police officers and 
their counterparts in the force. Additionally, the program is seeking to implement training 
centers with simulation rooms to support regular training exercises where officers will 
practice interaction with citizens.71 
  
2. The implementation of tools of policing: 
The implementation of policing tools involves changes on the administrative, operational and 
legislative fronts. To that end, the program is seeking to improve the existing policing 
infrastructure by bringing it up to standards conducive to effective policing. This includes 
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ensuring an adequate work environment for officers, which is up to safety standards- a 
condition that is necessary to facilitate secure and effective liaising with members of the 
public.72 
 
3. Organizational restructuring  
On the organizational restructuring front, an efficient system would entail a tiered scheme 
where regional units will be subject to monitoring from a central unit. On a local level, area 
police will direct the district officers who in turn function independently in terms of 
overseeing the activities of their respective localities. In this way, it is a response to Article 14 
of the Tunisian Constitution, which requires that “the state commits to strengthen 
decentralization and apply it throughout the country within the framework of the unity of the 
state.”73 More recently, another component to the program was the implementation in the six 
pilot police stations, the “local committee of security,” a discussion roundtable for dialogue 
between police forces, administrative forces, and local civil societies. What is innovative in 
this experience is that it is the first time civilians and members of the police have partnered to 
discuss security problems and introduce programs emerging from these mutual 
consultations.74  
 
4. Communication  
The communication component involves a uniform change, one of the criteria of SSR, which 
calls for a symbolic disassociation from the previous regime. Another element includes the 
improvement of technological capacity to facilitate an electronic database enabling socio-
demographic studies as well as the efficient circulation of security information. There should 
also be legislative improvements, which includes the adoption of a uniform standard of officer 
conduct.  
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E. CP Police Training Modules  
Officers will be required to undergo a seven module training course in the principles and 
pillars of community policing: human rights and fundamental freedoms; communication and 
group dynamics; problem solving methods; conference on criminology, juvenile delinquency, 
prophylaxis, and victimology; methodology and tools to become more familiar with the 
territory; and judicial training. The coaching will be conducted by instructors with field 
experience to train other instructors, who will in turn train the district agents.  
F. Community policing, a dynamic process  
As CP is a process in which civil society plays a key role, the involvement of local 
associations is essential.  Overall, there are approximately 264 different delegations on the 
local level of the administrative authorities. However, in some localities it is difficult to find 
associations to mobilize partnerships on security issues. Another commonly identified 
impediment to CP implementation is the resistance to change within the police force. Mr. 
Ishak argues that the problem (in the Tunisian case) is not resistance, but rather it is generally 
a misunderstanding among officers regarding their role within the CP mandate, not 
uncommon given the early phase of this program. The project seeks to address this gap 
through the launch of a series of training programs in police academies.  Moreover, although 
the CP program currently does not have a specific project for the promotion of the inclusion 
of women and the unique challenges they face, this issue is addressed under the umbrella of 
its programming under the fourth pillar concerning victims of violence.75 As noted, the CP 
program, in its pilot phase is ever evolving and seeking out new partnerships. Recently, a 
meeting between UNDP and UN Women (mandated to work gender equality and women’s 
empowerment) took place to discuss partnerships in the pilot police stations.  
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The above diagram illustrates the pillars of the Tunisian CP program.76 
 
V.  Discussion of problem areas in Tunisia   
There are a number of problem areas in Tunisian society, which remain under-addressed. This 
section discusses the lack of capacity to respond to problems endemic to Tunisia’s youth 
population. It then focuses on the roots of extremism in Tunisia, and the problem of 
inadequate vetting of security forces following the Revolution. Another focus area highlights 
the need for adequate policing response for issues specific to women.  
A. Tunisia’s youth population  
The youth population in Tunisia in general is the group most likely to come in contact with 
the criminal justice system. As a result of the socio-economic landscape in the country, young 
people are often disappointed with life and succumb to distracting vices such as marijuana. As 
a result, most people in prisons are young. Youth is a particularly sensitive population, easily 
manipulated because of both psychology and socio-economic context. In Tunisia they are 
often marginalized and excluded from the job market, with few economic opportunities. 
There are also few opportunities in terms of social life; the country lacks clubs and other 
                                                 
76 Id. 
  
 
 
Lea Lavut: Building Partnerships Towards a Democratic Police Force in the Post-
Revolutionary Tunisia Context 
122 
social outlets. They are also marginalized politically; political participation among youth is 
very low.77 
Consequently, they are under substantial pressure and often experience consequent mental 
health issues.  As a result, they tend to gravitate towards other areas of fulfillment such as 
drugs, or leftism or Salafism as outlets of social protest. They will often congregate in cafes, 
which are frequented by extremists from both sides, exposing youth to potential 
radicalization. 
Another result of this marginalization is the tendency of young people to leave the country.78 
There are two migration trends.  The first concerns those that leave to Italy or France to 
improve their economic condition. This group often undertakes perilous journeys by sea much 
like other refugees, risking their lives in the process. The other migration trend is that of 
radicalized youth to Syria. Those going to Syria experience extreme pessimism and the 
inability to realize their aspirations. Of those, there are some that actually do believe in Jihad 
and the cause of overthrowing the government of Bashar al Assad.79  
B. The roots of extremism in Tunisia: An imported phenomenon?  
The problem of radicalization in the country is reflected in the numbers of foreign fighters it 
exports to engage in jihad in Syria. In fact, Tunisia exports the highest number of Islamic 
extremists in the region. To date, figures of foreign fighters from Tunisia is estimated to be 
between 6,000-7,000.80 Some contend that actual figures are even higher; the Tunisian 
government claims it has prevented around 1,400 fighters from leaving the country. 
The debate over the roots of extremism in the country concerns different conceptions of 
political socialization. Some argue that this is an imported and relatively new phenomenon, 
that has emerged following the Revolution, as the space for expression opened up.81 Some 
argue that the political freedom also facilitates terrorism, as prior to the Revolution such 
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personal expression was forbidden.82 Others contend that it started before the Revolution as a 
result of the regime’s repressive policies concerning religion. Those seeking religion often 
turned to the Wahhabist version, which was readily accessible on satellite channels coming 
out of Saudi Arabia.83  As a result of the scarcity of alternate versions of religion, people 
embraced a more radical stream of Islam.84 Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Islamist 
party, Ennahda, has stated “Some people are surprised that a country as moderate as ours can 
now export the terrorists by the hundreds and thousands. These people are by no means the 
product of the revolution. Rather they are the product of dictatorship. Under the Old system, 
there was a spiritual vacuum in Tunisia. Then, after the revolution, foreign ideologies were 
imported into the country, they have taken advantage of this spiritual vacuum, they have 
invaded.”85 Former interim president Moncef Marzouki has voiced similar sentiments saying 
that “those who are committed to the obscurantist terrorist thinking are the very people who 
are from the Ben Ali schools: Mubarak and Bashar Assad, and not schools of freedom, 
democratic culture, free in their thinking, and modernist.” Moreover, he stated that “terrorism 
is the legitimate child of years of marginalization, dictatorship, arbitrariness and corruption,” 
emphasizing the fact that “young Arabs confront the loss in front of them and that migration 
to Europe to live is wandering under bridges or [they] join groups of death and obscurantism 
to discover its value.”86 Some argue that this repression gave way to radicalization, because in 
fact the Tunisians in Syria are the product of the repression of Ben Ali’s government; they 
could not attend prayers at their mosques and if they were caught going to prayer they risked 
arrest.87  Nuanced opinion on the issue recognizes this as a complex problem; these 
individuals cannot be cast as simply victims or villains, but rather possess traits of both.  The 
truth is somewhere within this ambiguous space. The profile of the perpetrator of the Bardot 
and Sousse attacks confirms this tension.  He had a clean criminal record, and his neighbors 
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described him as a “very clean college student and a very kind mosque-going moderate 
Tunisian.” 88 
C. Vetting security forces 
Another problematic area confronting post-Revolution Tunisia is the vetting of security 
forces. On 24 December 2013, the Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice 
was adopted by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA).  The law provides for a wide-
ranging strategy to address past human rights abuses.  This law includes a provision for the 
vetting of civil servants. Following the revolution, there was a number of high-profile 
dismissals and reassignments within the police.  Impunity remains a problem, however, as 
demonstrated for example in the 2012 criminal case involving the victimization of a young 
woman and her fiancé by police. Justice was delivered after two years of numerous appeals by 
the victims and a public outcry, resulting in a fifteen-year sentence for the police involved in 
the attack.89  More recently, in September 2015, problems surfaced over the lack of adequate 
vetting in the hiring of police. One hundred ten security members, belonging to various 
security agencies — the police, National Guard, Army, and Customs — were found to have 
various degrees of affiliation with terrorist organizations, and were dismissed.90 According to 
Walid Louguini, Communications Officer at the MOI, the dismissals were supported by 
substantial evidence.91 Taoufik Bouaoun, a senior-level official at the Ministry, states that 
officers were found to be involved in smuggling and terrorism. “When we entered the 
Ministry of Interior after the transition period, we discovered that some appointments were 
not subject to security criteria, namely that a safety investigation being conducted at the police 
station in the neighborhood [had] not been made.”92  Responding to this, officials at the police 
union attributed this to the existence of a “parallel police”, a unit within the security forces 
formed by the Islamist Ennahda Party when it was in power (late 2011-2014).  Bouaoun has 
denied this claim.  
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D. Women and community policing 
Another problem area in Tunisian society is the scarcity of adequate mechanisms to respond 
to difficulties faced by women.  One such dilemma is domestic violence, which is prevalent 
but not openly discussed due to public stigma. A survey demonstrated that one in five women 
in the country are victims of domestic violence.”93 It is generally uncommon for people to 
turn to the police in cases of domestic abuse.94 Women from marginal cities and women from 
the regions are especially affected by this. The women there tend to accept violence from their 
spouses and lack the courage to pursue any legal action for fear not only of losing but also of 
reprisal.95 At times, when victims do seek help from police, they are told to go home and 
forgive their husbands.96 
The legislative framework also plays a role in contributing to this problem.97 When the crime 
is committed against a spouse, the penalty is higher, yet there is a chasm between the written 
laws and actual practice, which is often influenced by tradition. Outcomes also depend on 
variables such as education. In cases of sexual harassment, police will counter the complaint 
by questioning the appropriateness of the victim’s attire or how late she was out, as if it 
invited the harassment.98  In general, there is a culture of victim-blaming.99 In the capital as 
well as the coastal areas, women are much more aware of their rights.100 This is true 
particularly in the area of divorce: In Tunisia, where marriage is firmly within civil law, the 
laws on divorce are unlike other Arab countries, where religious law governs. Women are free 
to go to court to request a divorce; in other countries only a man is allowed to initiate this 
process. Although women are generally emancipated and aware of their rights, many are not, 
as a result of having left school early.101 Consequently, they often lack support and financial 
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independence. There are a number of organizations that work to support women, such as a 
shelter in the Medina section of Tunis, which works with the Minister of Social Affairs, and 
another organization called Beity, which works independently on women’s legal issues.  
VI. Alternative Policing Models/CP policing within the counterterrorism milieu   
 
The role of de-radicalization programs in community policing and CVE  
The current security situation in Tunisia requires systemic proactive counter-terrorism efforts. 
There is an abundance of evidence demonstrating that proactive policing yields more valuable 
intelligence leads than aggressive policing. Key to this process is the implementation of a de-
radicalization program that builds on partnerships between civilian and state actors to assist 
with counter-terrorism efforts.102 Tunisia’s current policy of aggressive policing in this realm 
serves to fuel the rise of terrorism in the country, rather than to stem the tide. The current 
counter-terrorism law, adopted on 24 July 2015, lacks provisions for the prevention of violent 
extremism. This new law was a knee-jerk reaction to the events of Bardo and Sousse, and 
provides for harsher security measures and deviates from human rights standards.  For 
example, the law, broadly written, arms police with powers to arrest civilians for participating 
in peaceful demonstrations. This is clearly ineffective; many studies have shown that a large 
portion of extremists were in fact radicalized in prison.103   
The philosophy of de-radicalization  
There are two leading philosophies in international research of terrorism prevention:  de-
radicalization and disengagement. Disengagement involves the physical role change where a 
person leaves radical or terrorist groups, refuses to participate in illegal acts, and avoids 
insignia associated with the group, but does not necessarily change his ideology or world 
views. That is, at times terrorists may leave organizations and not commit illegal acts but still 
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follow the jihadi ideology. De-radicalization on the other hand “refers to the process of 
behavioral and attitudinal change.”104 Individuals classified as de-radicalized have not only 
left the terrorist group but also abandoned the radical ideology.  
2. Disengagement or de-radicalization?  
There is debate among policymakers as to which approach is more effective. Those 
advocating for disengagement alone argue that it is an effective means of counterterrorism 
because it is more successful and more legitimate.105 Using this approach helps to avoid 
scenarios where it may be perceived that an attempt is made to influence political or religious 
opinion when an illegal act has not actually occurred, problematic on practical and human-
rights levels. However, the consensus among politicians and researchers is that there is an 
element of radical ideology that is fundamentally dangerous and threatening to democracy. 
Radicalism where crime has not yet taken place should still be subject to some form of civil 
society intervention. The limitation of the de-radicalization approach is that it is almost 
impossible to measure; it is difficult to ascertain whether a person is a National Socialist or 
jihadi with absolute certainty. De-radicalization then, involves initiatives executed by various 
actors that may include state or non-state actors who assist people involved in radicalization 
to leave by means of debating and discussing the underlying ideology.  This method is seen as 
a necessary element in the process of disengagement because when persuading an individual 
to abandon a group, it is important to address the motivations behind why the person initially 
joined. When conceptualizing de-radicalization programs in any context there are three levels 
of impact: macrosocial, mesosocial, and microsocial.106 De-radicalization programs are 
intervention programs on micro- and mesosocial levels. Most of these programs work with 
individuals in prison or outside of prison. De-radicalization programs on a mesosocial level 
are family counseling programs.  
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Case study: De-radicalization in the German context 
The German context is a complex one. It has grappled with right wing extremism and 
jihadism for some time, and has a variety of NGOs and state-run programs addressing these 
issues.107 In 2000, the first individual microsocial de-radicalization program for neo-Nazis 
was founded. Following that, eighteen programs have been established. Of those, most are 
governmental programs such as those run by police and intelligence agencies, which include 
three that operate, the remaining functioning on a state level.  Although there are many such 
programs at this level, NGOs and governmental organizations that address far-right 
extremism typically do not cooperate; they are quite critical towards one another over the 
methods each employ and they tend to disagree over definitions. The NGOs in general are 
quite critical of intelligence and police agencies.  Furthermore, there is a dearth of 
investigation and evaluation of these programs in Germany.  
In the realm of jihadism, a different scenario emerges. It is a fairly new phenomenon in the 
German context, as militant Salafism or Islamic extremism only started to emerge around 
2004-2005, in contrast to right-wing extremism, which as Koehler puts it “we basically 
invented…”108 Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has contended with a 
sizable militant right wing movement. Today, authorities estimate the figures of neo-Nazis at 
22,600 of which 11,800 are militant neo-Nazis. By comparison, the number of militant 
Islamists or Salafists in Germany is estimated to be around a maximum of 8,350, and 500 
violent jihadists.109 
Public-private partnerships  
In 2012, the German Federal Office for Immigration and Refugee Affairs, which operates 
under the Federal Ministry of Interior, established a nationwide counseling hotline for de-
radicalization.110 This hotline initiative is actually a public-private partnership.  Families may 
call the hotline free of charge if they have reason to believe an individual is involved in a 
radical movement.  In the initial phase of the response, the concerned party receives first-line 
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counseling by a state or government official.111 Following that, the individual is referred to 
one of four agencies that provide long-term counseling. These four NGOs, funded by the 
government, are located across Germany and the public private partnership is measured to be 
effective in terms of successfully reaching the target groups. The metric of success is seen in 
the figures: Since January 2012, there we 2,589 calls, which resulted in 1,224 counseling 
cases for the nine NGO partners. The long-term counseling involves, for example, ongoing 
discussion with parents, who can contact their assigned NGO counselor as frequently as they 
wish, with all problems relating to radicalization. The counselor works with the parent to 
identify what the root causes of radicalization of the person in question were, and to also 
come up with solutions to issues that were driving the individual to turn to radicalization in 
the first place. 
Daniel Koehler, who was involved in the creation of the methodology and theories behind 
these programs112, in 2011 notes that there is a gap between how these programs were meant 
to operate and how they operate in practice.113 Nevertheless, the program was considered to 
be successful in terms of meeting a demand 114 and as a result since last year, many German 
states have started to create smaller versions of this counseling network in their own areas.115 
They are essentially establishing state level networks between family ministries, social 
ministries, law enforcement agencies and NGOs to conduct the counseling and run the 
hotlines. 116 
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The de-radicalization hotline  
The question of the willingness of a family member or other close associate of a radicalized 
individual to report that individual’s activities can be explained with the criminal 
phenomenon known as “leakage.” Criminals such as school shooters, mass murders and 
suicide bombers will often “leak” pieces of information regarding the intent of the crime to 
their people in their immediate environment. For example, in the case of one of the 
perpetrators of Sousse, Seifeddine Rezgui, some of the signs or radicalization were exhibited 
in the time leading up to the crime.117 Rezgui attended college in Kairouan, a city in Tunisia, 
which became a hotspot for Ansar al-Sharia activity in the aftermath of the Revolution. In 
June 2014, he updated his cover photo on Facebook to a black banner symbolic of the Islamic 
State.118  In many cases, families and associates, though informed to a certain degree, tend not 
to contact the authorities out of a sense of loyalty, fearing they will inflame the problem. This 
is where this medium of a low-key hotline or contact focal point for assessment of the 
situation and neutral moderation is effective. Those needing assistance may also opt to receive 
services from the agencies that are part of the police or intelligence services.  This network of 
NGOs will provide these services to the families so that they are spared the dilemma that is 
attached to calling the police. They also have the option to call the NGOs directly, without 
having to go through the hotline. In some cases however, when a counselor makes the 
judgment that a particular case poses a security risk, the counselor is required to inform the 
relevant government agencies. In such cases, the families are informed that this will take 
place. 
The key is to gauge what it is that these families need. In many of these cases, there are 
families that are frightened by the possibility of losing their children, and this fear drives their 
desire to seek any assistance possible. As Koehler says “I think it's a little bit finding out what 
they really need. So most cases you do have a large number of families who are simply afraid 
of losing their sons and daughters forever so these mothers are panicking- they are extremely 
afraid of that and there will be a point when their fear and pain is so large that they will try out 
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any help they can get.”119 Koehler recounts his experience as a counselor receiving calls from 
parents who say “I don't care please put him in jail; I want him to be alive in Germany and not 
dead in Syria.”120 At this point parents are past the point of fearing the involvement of police; 
in many cases they actually prefer it.121 
Counselors adhere to a privacy policy, in which if they rule out criminal and illegal elements 
in a case, they are not required to transfer it to the intelligence agencies. Certainly intelligence 
agencies follow their own standards, and there is a fairly certain possibility that these agencies 
tap into counseling calls. Germany is not the exception; in France and the UK this is a 
standard occurrence. “Legally, and institutionally I will always say we will operate on a 
privacy regulations and data protection regulations, I, as a counselor, did not automatically 
report [behavior] to authorities, to the police, to intelligence unless I come across something 
that is clearly illegal.”122 At this moment, when the counselor becomes aware of a potentially 
terrorist-related crime, the obligation to report attaches. It is important for the counselor to be 
transparent about the procedures, and this trust-building in turn yields an increase in the 
number of families willing to turn to these organizations for assistance. Families will often not 
call the hotline because of their inherent fear and distrust of the government, and some will 
call NGOs. However, as a result of how closely knit these communities tend to be, if a family 
that was previously reluctant to take action observes success, they are more likely to contact 
the program themselves, when such a need arises.  
 
De-radicalization programs are globally and contextually transferable   
In the German case, the families that have sought the services of the de-radicalization 
program there are demographically mixed. The counseling cases are split almost evenly 
between those with a traditional Muslim background and those that are secular, possibly 
second generation immigrants to Germany originating from Turkey and North Africa for 
example. Those that are not particularly devout still have a certain affinity towards Islam in 
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terms of the language and culture, and in these cases their children may discover the religion 
of their ancestors. There is also a sizable portion of cases that involve German Christian 
families that have never come in contact with Islam, whose children convert to Islam. In terms 
of economic and social backgrounds, the demographics are also very mixed.123 There are 
young people with high school and university level educations, families that are wealthy and 
those that are poor, and those that come from entirely intact family units as well as those from 
broken homes with psychological problems.124 In short, there is no specific generalized 
snapshot of a classic client for the program.  
The counseling process is very much akin to a standard human relationship process where 
trust is key. Koehler’s experience as a trainer of counselors involved emphasizing the 
importance of securing trust from the families and their role as mediators between the families 
and the pertinent institutions. During the process, the counselor discusses the situation with 
the family, provides a risk assessment and, evaluates why the individual has been radicalizing, 
formulates a plan of action, comes up with solutions to remedy the problem, and decides who 
the relevant focal points will be to deal with a particular situation. Communication in the 
process is critical as well as the improvement of trust. At times the counselor may need to 
inform those that raise the complaint that action by external actors is necessary and advise 
them that this may spare their child from an almost guaranteed eventuality of ending up in 
Syria, or carrying out a horrific crime.  
7. Partnerships with police for countering violent extremism 
At this stage in the process, a case becomes the responsibility of the police.125 Here, it is 
contingent on the security infrastructure in a particular country. In Germany, counselors rely 
on a network of specially trained police officers who are qualified to respond to crimes of this 
specific nature in the police unit or in the local state forces. A counselor may simply place a 
call and arrange to meet the police officer in an unofficial capacity to discuss the case. 
Partnerships between police and counselors are an integral part of this process, where these 
personal networks can make the difference in the process for effective de-radicalization. 
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Koehler, for example, has personal contacts and friendships with police and intelligence 
officers, which has facilitated a mutually beneficial and effective dynamic. These contacts 
will willingly cooperate on cases in a non-official capacity, making deals such as allowing 
him to lead the case for the time being, as long as they are kept appraised of the details and in 
exchange he will share some of the credit. At times, the process is initiated by the police who 
may have a case in which nothing strictly illegal has occurred and request him to take the case 
as a counselor.  
Together with trust and partnerships, a counselor is also required to inform all sides involved, 
including the police, of their respective rights and responsibilities. In a typical situation the 
police will conduct a home raid, and often they view the family as a risk and tend not to 
engage with them. Their activities will include the confiscation of computers and cell phones 
most likely late at night, treating the family like criminals, and if not, the family will 
inevitably still feel that way.  Koehler, in his role as counselor, will explain to police officers 
if he is able, to ensure they do not cross any legal boundaries. He will also explain to the 
family the reason for the police presence, and the fact that officers are restricted from 
communicating with them as this may compromise the investigation. Together with legal 
advice, the counselor establishes communication and trust among the various authorities and 
institutions, with police being just one component in the equation. Other stakeholders such as 
schools, employers, social and health service providers are also involved.126  
 
Are De-radicalization programs effective? 
There is currently no research data to gauge the effectiveness of the German model of de-
radicalization. As noted, a useful barometer of success in this particular case, is the fact that 
the intended target group is reached. Moreover, families from particularly radicalized cases, 
whose children were in Syria or were returning from there as active ISIL combatants were 
involved in the de-radicalization program. On the other hand, a reduction in the numbers of 
individuals leaving to Syria and Iraq was not observed. The number of German foreign 
fighters has recently dropped; however, authorities are unsure as to the reason behind this 
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trend. In terms of qualitative impact, Koehler has observed, based on almost a hundred cases 
in the last few years, that there is clear indication of positive outcomes such as young people 
returning to schools, resumption of activities such as listening to music, meeting non-Muslim 
friends, making plans for the future and dating.127 These are strong signs of de-radicalization. 
It is important to note that in the German context, this family counseling network is a 
mesosocial instrument, focusing on the family in the social environment. There are numerous 
individual de-radicalization programs for neo-Nazis. This is a tremendous problem as 
counselors are at a loss when faced with a radicalized individual making the decision within 
the family counseling process to depart from the group. This is where the microsocial 
individual de-radicalization program for intensive individual counseling is extremely 
important. Although it is still early at this stage to gauge what the long term results are, the 
indications of the positive impacts of the de-radicalization program in Germany has been the 
forging and developing of networks and communications between various governmental and 
non-governmental institutions and stakeholders such as community leaders, mosques, 
associations, social workers and police officers.  
Convincing the police of the merits of their role in this process  
One of the problems in this process is that securing the trust of authorities and police officers 
is by far the most difficult task, more so than the families that require this assistance. Police 
officers tend not to trust actors outside of the force; they tend to believe that repression and 
force are often the solution. Implementing such a program involves establishing the problem 
and selling the program as an effective solution. In Koehler’s work providing assistance to 
countries wishing to set up this program, there are key principles that are important for 
program buy-in.128 One of the principles, is the staffing of the program, which involves 
ensuring that retired former police officers are on the staff as consultants so that they “speak 
the language” of the police officer. They are able to engage in discussions with their former 
colleagues on the level that non police officers could not. They can also better relate to the 
officers and convey to them that they have experience doing the work they do, having 
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received the same training. This ability to relate between program staff and officers works to 
establish the trust needed for the latter’s program buy-in.  
Another principle is that when working to establish buy-in for authorities of this program it is 
important to emphasize the benefits of this program in carrying out their work. De-
radicalization can be an important instrument in identifying hot spots of radicalization, 
reasons behind radicalization, new and emerging groups, as well as new styles of 
radicalization.  In short, de-radicalization programs are an effective tool for counterterrorism 
policing and “can actually help to sharpen the repressive tools of the police.”129 It works in 
CVE policing through the intelligence that materializes in the communication that takes place 
with a family that seeks assistance.  The counselor becomes privy to any specific mosque or a 
particular individual in a community that is actively radicalizing and recruiting young people. 
In such a case, the counselor may refrain from disclosing the name of the person concerned to 
the police, and instead tip them off to what mosque they should focus on or on the person or 
group involved in recruitment and radicalization. It helps the police with the cases they are 
working on where the suspect’s behavior suggests he is involved in certain activities that are 
not concrete enough for the case to be proven in court. By enlisting the assistance of the 
counselor, it enables the officer to remain close to the case and work together to ascertain 
whether there has been an escalation or de-escalation. So in this way, the cooperation of 
police with a counselor becomes a mutually beneficial exchange.   
Another component involves working towards a mentality shift among officers regarding their 
perception of the counselors they partner with. This involves training and transparency. Police 
"officers tend to believe NGOs are incompetent to carry out risk assessment that meets their 
standards because in their view they know crime, and how to solve it, and jailing people is 
their domain. Although NGOs are usually associated with the “soft” measures approach, 
many of them are in fact well-trained to respond to such issues on par with the standards of 
police, with tools for risk analysis and assessment such as the VERA 2 Protocol,130 an 
evidenced based approach for risk assessment, which utilizes the structured risk assessment 
methodology. 131 The tool is comprised of 31 indictors, which help to calibrate risk level of 
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potential terrorists. The purpose of risk assessment is to “evaluate the risk that an individual 
will commit acts of ideologically motivated violence (when at liberty);” and secondly, to “use 
the information to develop counter-terrorism strategies and programs for the individual while 
in detention.”132  
133 
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Do material incentives work? 
How do you motivate a radicalized individual towards reform? The usefulness of material 
incentives is often debated within the discussion on effective de-radicalization programs. 
Some programs, such as the one in Saudi Arabia 135 use material incentives to essentially fund 
everything an individual requires including housing, a car, and marriage.136 Koehler argues 
that this produces insincere motivations for an individual to cooperate with the program.137  
Other programs do not provide any material incentives such as the ones in Germany that work 
with Neo-nazis. In Koehler’s assessment, it should be something between those two scenarios, 
where Jihadis or returnees from Syria may face issues such as PTSD or difficulties with labor 
market reintegration. Instead of delving out cash, assistance should take the form of 
psychological counseling, job training, drug treatment, housing, and perhaps facilitating a new 
social environment.138 In Germany and many European countries social services exist to assist 
with these already. There is also a program in Somalia for example that provides assistance to 
former Al Shabaab fighters in the form of basic computer skills, fishing, and mechanics.139  In 
essence, building capacity, as opposed to simple cash handouts, to support an individual with 
the tools to successfully reintegrate into society is critical for the de-radicalization process to 
be effective and sustainable. 
The Philosophy of Community Policing  
Community policing is an organizational strategy. There are three inherently interrelated 
fundamental obligations of CP: Citizen involvement, problem solving and decentralization. 
Disregarding any of the three will inevitably hinder the success of the program.140 One of the 
tenets of CP is its emphasis on organizational reform.  By definition, it is “a process rather 
than a product.”141 Police departments seeking to implement CP programs are often faced 
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with organizational obstacles. Other local issues take precedence and CP falls in priority as 
officers assigned to CP  “get drained back into the main force.”142 This is a common problem 
in the UK CP program, where the effort is made to solve this through a strategy of “ring 
fencing” in which they attempt to prevent top commanders from poaching officers assigned to 
CP. However, the reality is that they are still moved as one cannot disobey the instructions of 
top commanders. As a result of its place in the power structure of the organization, the CP 
program tends to experience continued problems.143 Common impediments include the facts 
that CP occupies a significant portion of an officer’s time and that CP does not appear in 
productivity metrics: The number of arrests, how fast they respond, etc. The criteria used to 
assess an officer’s performance in CP duties do not appear to yield any concrete, quantifiable 
results. A department risks its image when it has a significant portion of its officers assigned 
to CP assignments as the “metrics don't seem to show productivity in the way in which police 
departments have traditionally defined it.”144 Furthermore, the fact is that police departments 
in the US and UK are, to an increasing extent, metric-driven and these metrics fail to reflect 
CP activities and results. Criteria such as community confidence, community satisfaction and 
community involvement are left out of policing metrics.145 Therefore, the prioritization of 
other problems and the lack of performance metrics are some of the organizational obstacles 
police departments struggle with in their implementation efforts of the CP program.146 
When conceptualizing underlying causes of crime and disorder in society, there is an 
overarching similarly across communities in the world.  In most areas, poverty is almost 
always strongly associated with area crime. In the United States, for example, in communities 
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with high youth unemployment, involvement in crime, particularly in gang organization and 
gang-related violence, is inevitably interrelated, to a large extent with drug distribution as well 
since it is an alternative economy. In the American context, “youth violence is related to gun 
violence, related to street gangs — not young men hanging at street corners and shooting at 
each other with often no discernible reason so that over time in American cities the homicide 
problem has become increasingly concentrated on young poor males with guns.”147 Other 
forms of homicides have decreased considerably over the last twenty years. Given the 
interrelatedness of youth violence and lack of economic opportunity and prospects for 
realization of aspirations for life, the inability of individuals in these communities to perceive 
a future beyond that existing in the present is central to the disorder that prevails as a result. 
Within the police department itself, the resistance of officers tends to be among the main 
impediments to CP implementation and SSR overall.  Although not many studies have been 
conducted on police culture, in the contexts that it has been studied, including the US, UK, 
France, Italy and Croatia, a number of overarching features have been identified. 148 Some of 
these include a tremendous sense of isolation of officers from the community they police, 
where the former sees the latter as the problem, not the solution. Another is the high sense of 
internal solidarity among the officers not only externally against the public, but to a greater 
degree against the politicians and especially against the media. Moreover, there is internal 
solidarity against their own commands, the result of which is that bad news tends to travel up 
the hierarchical structure within the organization.149 Officers experience a sense of cynicism 
concerning the motives of members of the public and leaders who they regard as being 
removed from what they perceive as the reality, who in their view “pander to politicians” and 
disregard the needs of the rank and file.150 Together with solidarity and cynicism, there exists 
a “kind of internal homophobia, gender phobia, and poor legal conservatism” that contributes 
to this cynicism and makes officers doubtful towards members within their own ranks as well, 
who do not resemble police officers in their attire and speech. The internal divisions span 
across racial lines and especially across gender and sexual-preference lines. There is also the 
                                                 
147 Id. 
148 Interview with Dr. Wesley G. Skogan, Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University and expert 
on community policing. New York. 4 August 2015. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
  
 
 
Lea Lavut: Building Partnerships Towards a Democratic Police Force in the Post-
Revolutionary Tunisia Context 
140 
tendency of placing a premium on crime fighting, where officers see “taking on the bad guys” 
and safeguarding a weak ignorant public from criminals likely to wreak havoc on society if 
given the chance as their primary duties.151 The prevailing view among the police then, is that 
everything that does not involve aggressive crime fighting and tackling violent criminals does 
not fall under the remit of their work. Everything outside of that in their view is social work 
and serves as a diversion from what they consider to be “real” police work, an agenda that 
panders to politicians. Thus CP is viewed as antithetical to the police agenda from the 
perspective of police culture.152 At the officer level, police culture has a way of hindering all 
sorts of reform. Police culture tends to want less constraint on the use of force and robust 
crackdowns, and tends to disregard politicians and their rhetoric. Indeed, the experts tasked 
with developing and implementing CP programs have attributed the difficulty of police buy-in 
to the fact that the benefits of such a program are not apparent to them.153 
Reform should be a sustained effort  
Effective reform is a tough endeavor and as such requires a sustained effort.154 As Skogan 
notes, “there is no such thing as solidifying your game, these organizations will slide back to 
zero overnight if you don't keep the pressure up.”155 Hence, police reform is extremely 
difficult and it often fails at least to a certain extent.156 Where there is a legacy of abuse or 
mistrust, any efforts to convince the community of the efficacy of CP can be difficult when it 
is undermined by corruption. This can only be solved by long term, continuous efforts by the 
police department to convince the community that their commitment is sincere. This entails 
demonstrating that the program is not merely a public relations strategy by continuing the 
program after media attention ceases to focus on it. The public needs to be convinced that the 
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program will continue to exist over a long period of time, and that if they bring up issues they 
need to be convinced that something will happen in response — that their input translates to 
action, to the expression of their concerns, and that the police are responding with concrete 
action.  From the citizen side, it is critical to see feedback and consequences; one of the key 
factors in this regard is the need for consistency in the personnel deployed to CP, so that 
citizens know that when they submit a complaint it is simple to follow up with the same 
officers.  This keeps the officer accountable to the citizen.157 Police tend to be wary of the 
possibility of being held accountable to civilians, and the lack of accountability is likely to 
cause failure of CP programs. CP programs have in the past succeeded in some of the most 
crime ridden localities in Chicago for example, where residents tended to be highly skeptical 
about the police as a result of a history of negative interaction/poor confrontation among 
police and civilians, due to the visibility of the program and the efforts of the police force. 
Hence, although they were “at best dubious and at worse somewhat hostile,”158 citizens saw 
the positive outcomes conspicuously occurring in their neighborhoods.  Another contributing 
factor to the success of Chicago was that Chicago was programmed like many of its 
counterparts at the start of 1990 when neighborhood crime was at its peak.159 It decreased by 
60 percent in Chicago, and in parallel, attendance dropped as well because “attendance was 
driven by concern about crime and when attendance drops, crime drops — it is a natural 
phenomenon.”160  People invested efforts in this because of their interest in it, and when the 
issues began to diminish as a result of the significant crime drop, their participation dropped, 
as the data shows.  
To effect change, leadership and supervision are critical, where commanders present a strong 
vision of what it is they expect from the rank and file, and so that that their visions are aligned 
and they believe in their supervisors, instead of believing that their supervisors are pandering 
to politicians through press releases. The supervisory levels in the police hierarchy have to 
“keep their nose to the grindstone and keep their eye on the rule book”161 and ensure they stay 
within policy. If there is no commitment to the program, at top level to genuine direction of 
                                                 
157 Interview with Dr. Wesley G. Skogan, Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University and expert 
on community policing. New York. 4 August 2015. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
  
 
 
Lea Lavut: Building Partnerships Towards a Democratic Police Force in the Post-
Revolutionary Tunisia Context 
142 
the organization and at the supervisory level to proper implementation of the program, the 
changes will not be effective.  As Skogan puts it “sergeants are like the transition belt they 
link the wheels of the car to the motor. If the sergeants will not be the transition belts for 
policy in an effective way, the organization will never get anywhere it wants to go.”162 Hence, 
supervision is critical in the equation for successful, effective and sustainable CP program 
implementation.  
 
Prospects for Reform in Tunisia 
 
Following the revolution and responding to calls from Tunisian human rights institutions, 
there have been a number of reforms aimed at improving the human rights situation in Tunisia 
and accounting for the past.  In 2012, Tunisia went through its first Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) cycle, during which it accepted 110 of 125 recommendations.  For example, it has 
ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance; the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court; and the Agreement on 
Privileges and Immunities of the Court Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.163  On January 2017, 
Tunisia is up for its next UPR review.  Part of its current effort is bringing Tunisian police 
training up to international standards of human rights law.164 
Though these have been notable efforts, there have also been impediments to genuine reform.  
Members of the National Constituent Assembly have faced persistent pressure from police 
unions and as a result have mostly avoided robust regulation of the security sector in the 2014 
Constitution.  The exception is Article 19, which states, “The national security forces are 
republican; they are responsible for maintaining security and public order, ensuring the 
protection of individuals, institutions, and property, and ensuring the enforcement of the law 
while ensuring that freedoms are respected, with complete impartiality.”165  Furthermore, the 
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Tunisian Truth and Justice Commission has experienced problems with the police over access 
to police archives.166 
There are also a number of international efforts at SSR underway. International institutional 
capacity building assistance is provided by the United States under its International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement (INL) programming.  It is currently implementing an INL program to 
support prison reform in Mannouba Women’s Prison.167  Another INL-supported program is 
the construction of the Ennfidha Hammamet Police Academy, which will be launched in 
2019.168 The US has contributed over $100 million for this project.169 In a joint announcement 
in November 2015, the Minister of Interior, Najem Gharsalli,  and U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
the Bureau of INL, William R. Brownfield, stated that the training program would be able to 
train 1,800 recruits and provide training “in accordance with international standards and 
modern methods.”170 Brownfield stated that, "co-operation between Tunisia and the United 
States in the security field has shifted from a partnership based on providing equipment and 
organizing training sessions to a long-term partnership to develop the skills of Tunisian 
security forces.”171 Finland is also involved in a capacity-building project within the Tunisian 
police and National Guard, in a joint project between the MOI and the Police College of 
Finland.172 
Political parties remain divided on issues of SSR. The Islamist Enehada is criticized because it 
ostensibly granted too much freedom of expression to Islamic radicals in the period following 
the revolution.  This rationale, used to defend counter-terrorism measures, is used to justify 
giving the police broad powers to act with impunity. “Security forces are receiving uncritical 
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support from the anti-Islamist segments of the political elite,”173 which may be problematic in 
terms of how these groups will actually support SSR efforts in the future.  
 
VII.  Recommendations 
 
1. Creating an alternate space for Tunisia’s youth  
One of the problem areas in Tunisian society is the lack of services geared towards its youth 
population. Public policy therefore, should focus efforts on the establishment of programs to 
address the root causes of discontent, most prominently experienced by this sector of the 
population.  The result is a vacuum created by social and economic exclusion, which is 
endemic in the Tunisian context. It is therefore important to promote a space within which 
youth can channel their creative energy, realize their aspirations for life, and feel secure whilst 
developing a healthy sense of identity. Efforts should also be focused on addressing the 
shortage of cultural initiatives, such as film and music festivals in which young people can 
participate. Programs assist with keeping youth off the streets and create alternatives to 
congregating in cafés, which are hotspots for terrorist recruitment in Tunisia. Afterschool 
programs should be also be established for those attending school. In fact, the evidence 
proven by a number of studies on afterschool programs demonstrate its crime prevention 
benefits. In turn, the programs benefit police by reducing the strain on both police officers and 
law enforcement resources. Moreover, after school programs serve as effective jail diversion 
mechanisms thereby addressing Tunisia’s problem of jail overcrowding.  
 
2. Addressing the weak mental health services infrastructure  
The dearth in mental health capacity contributes to crime and disorder in Tunisia.  A joint 
effort between policymakers, mental health professionals, law enforcement and the 
community is crucial in order to bridge this gap. The formation of partnerships is extremely 
critical in this process. One such partnership is the implementation of a CIT-style response 
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program for police to respond to incidents involving the mentally ill. Involvement in the CIT 
program should represent various stakeholders, including the civil society, law enforcement 
and communities. Since one of the problems behind the lack of action is the stigma that exists 
in all facets of society, raising awareness of mental illness is important so that both the police 
and the community can work as partners towards alternatives, especially where this 
population contributes to crime. As noted, the implementation of such a program can be 
executed in a cost effective way, as it functions to enhance the officer’s regularly assigned 
duties. The cost of the program is also justified by the way in which it contributes to the 
outcome of such a proactive policing strategy: This will again, result in reducing the strain on 
police officers and resources. And as with other proactive policing strategies, developing 
crisis response infrastructure to address particular problems results in positive outcomes such 
as reducing the high number of detainees and the decrease in crime and disorder in society.  
 
3.  Developing and implementing the Tunisian de-radicalization program 
The current climate of high insecurity in Tunisia calls for a robust counter-terrorism policing 
effort. In order to address the problem of radicalization in the country, the establishment and 
implementation of a comprehensive risk reduction mechanism in the form of a de-
radicalization program tailored to the Tunisian context, would be beneficial. The program 
would be based on the best practices of programs implemented in other countries such as the 
German model, as well as incorporate specific features, tailored to the Tunisian context.  This 
strategy involves the formation of partnerships between police and NGOs. Counselors trained 
in risk assessment tools, such as VERA 2, would assist police with counter intelligence. 
However, for this program to be effective, stakeholders must secure the trust of the 
community. Moreover, since the program entails a similar approach to CP, the Tunisian CP 
pilot program can work alongside this initiative.  
The implementation of the Tunisian de-radicalization program will serve to respond to 
addressing the root causes of terrorism, which in turn may reduce the problem of 
radicalization. Currently, there is a grassroots effort in the form of the de-radicalization 
program, Rescue Association of Tunisians Trapped Abroad (RATTA). This NGO is small, 
but well known for their efforts on de-radicalization and family counseling. The organization 
recently estimated through its work on the issue, that approximately 400-500 fights have 
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inconspicuously returned to Tunisia.174 This grassroots effort should be expanded into a more 
solid engagement and mainstreamed into existing social and economic programs.  
 
4. Counter-terrorism capacity building  
Counter-terrorism planning should focus on building policing capacity in this realm. 
Specifically, an emphasis should be placed on the training of police on proper response. In 
order to ensure effective police response and a decrease on reliance on coercive and 
aggressive policing tactics, it is essential to increase adequate resources. To that end, 
investment for better policing equipment as well as increasing intelligence capabilities is 
crucial.  Security forces properly equipped to respond to security threats are less likely to rely 
on coercive and aggressive policing tactics. Moreover, the problem of inadequate equipment 
in police work tends to result in heightened stress among officers. This in turn has been 
correlated with increased use of force.  
 
5. The reinvigoration of civil society efforts: Civil society in Tunisia plays a key role in 
galvanizing social change as it did in the events of the 2011 Revolution. In the aftermath, civil 
society continued its work when it rallied to ensure that the demands of the Revolution are 
reflected in the new constitution. However, as result of the recent clampdown on expression 
in the context of counter-terrorism, civil society fervor has waned. In order to ensure the 
existence of democracy, civil society efforts need to regain its 2011 momentum.  
 
6. Community involvement in community policing: 
Finally, for CP programs to be successful, community involvement is critical. In past cases of 
CP implementation, citizens tended to refrain from availing of such programs. Increased 
citizen engagement ensures not only CP program success; it also promotes police integrity 
because the participation of community members ensures officer accountability. The 
engagement of law enforcement with the community it polices, serves to enhance the 
effectiveness of police work. The continued exchange between law enforcement and 
community, where there is mutual participation on issues as they emerge, and this 
collaboration contributes towards the overarching objective of strengthening the rule of law.  
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VIII.  Conclusions 
In recent months as ISIL has been carrying out numerous terrorist acts in rapid succession, 
policymakers in administrations around the world debate how to tackle this growing threat. 
Although Tunisia has successfully completed a number of reforms with international 
assistance to its security sector and other areas of government, the problem of coercive and 
aggressive policing remains.  Though the existing operational structure has uncovered and 
suppressed a number of terrorist plots, the recent actions of security forces remain 
incompatible with an effective, democratic police force. A robust and effective security sector 
is needed to counter the multiple problems Tunisia faces. This can only be accomplished 
through thorough commitment to true institutional change. The Tunisian community policing 
program shows great promise to act as this medium of change. 
The primary means by which Tunisia has begun to reform its security sector has been tough 
community policing, which aims to bring together different stakeholders in both government 
and society in order to ensure that dialogue exists, that voices are heard, and that the policies 
that ultimately emerge reflect consensus.  Such a consensus, though it inevitably involves 
substantial compromises, ensures that all stakeholders feel a sense of ownership of ultimate 
policy adopted. 
The other means by which Tunisia has attempted to reform its police force is by adopting the 
crisis intervention team model.  Many social problems stem from mental health issues and 
inadequate response to them.  The Memphis model ensures that the needs of the mentally ill 
are being met while society is being protected.  Heavy-handed methods of detention and 
imprisonment are abandoned in favor of immediate counseling and support, notably at the site 
of the crisis itself through the use of specially trained police officers.  The ranks of the radical 
Islamic movement are filled with many unstable individuals.  Providing prevention and 
intervention, before and during the process of radicalization, are necessary to prevent its 
completion.  In other words, enlightened policies towards the mentally ill are essential 
components of an overall process of political stabilization and democratic consolidation. 
Building and expanding partnerships between security forces and society, based on the 
emerging needs, does not occur over night. Trust takes a long time to develop.  Building 
effective partnerships requires the government to take into consideration the needs of all 
stakeholders, including as an initial threshold, the need of societal groups to trust the police 
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and to even be willing to participate efforts at dialogue.  This in turn requires the needs of the 
police to be met, notably by providing mechanisms by which incentives to take bribes, 
participate in corruption, and act with impunity against citizens are reduced.  The police 
themselves feel persecuted, as if they are immediately identified with the abuses of the former 
regime. 
Nonetheless there is reason to be hopeful about the future of security forces in Tunisia.  CP 
Models already exist around the world and are being adopted in Tunisia.  Tunisia has received 
substantial international support to engage in this type of institutional capacity-building.  
Though domestic terrorism remains a threat, many of the different stakeholders recognize that 
there is greater danger in aggressive policing methods.  Tunisia may be at a crossroads, but 
the roads that are currently crossing each other include a number of positive concepts, the 
value of which have been recognized. 
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